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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Benjamin Brackett appeals from the district court’s order denying his fourth motion
for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
This is Brackett’s sixth appeal relating to his 2013 convictions for possession of sexually
exploitive materials and sexual battery on a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. 1 In its
opinion affirming Brackett’s judgments of conviction on direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals
summarized the underlying facts and proceedings as follows:
In January 2011, a minor reported to authorities that she had a sexual
relationship with forty-six-year-old Brackett. At the time of the relationship, the
minor was sixteen years old. Officers recovered a camera containing many sexually
explicit photos of the minor, which the minor claimed were taken by Brackett and
some of which depicted her having sexual contact with Brackett. Brackett was
charged with eight counts of possession of sexually exploitive materials, I.C. § 18–
1507A, and eight counts of sexual battery on a minor child of sixteen or
seventeen, I.C. § 18–1508A. Brackett’s first trial ended in a mistrial after Brackett,
during his opening statement, violated the district court’s pretrial order. After his
second trial, Brackett was found guilty by a jury of eight counts of possession of
sexually exploitive materials and five counts of sexual battery on a minor child of
sixteen or seventeen.
State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 624, 377 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Ct. App. 2016).
While Brackett’s direct appeal was still pending, he filed his first motion for a new trial, in
which he asserted the existence of newly discovered evidence. See State v. Brackett, Docket No.

1

See State v. Brackett, Docket No. 40867 (denial of motion construed as writ of mandamus); State
v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 377 P.3d 1082 (Ct. App. 2017) (Docket. No. 41578, direct appeal);
State v. Brackett, Docket No. 44143, 2017 WL 5166933 (Idaho App. 2017) (appeal from denial of
second motion for a new trial); State v. Brackett, Docket No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 (Idaho
App. 2018) (appeal from denial of third motion for a new trial); Brackett v. State, Docket No.
45402 (post-conviction appeal, pending decision).
1

44143, 2017 WL 5166933 at *1 (Idaho App. 2017) (unpublished). The district court denied the
motion and Brackett did not file a timely notice of appeal from this denial order. See id.
Brackett filed a second motion for a new trial on October 5, 2015, in which he again
asserted the existence of newly discovered evidence. Id. at *1-3. Specifically, Brackett produced
an affidavit of Timothy J. Miner. Id. In the affidavit, Miner alleged that he spoke with the victim
after the second jury trial. Id. at *2. According to the affidavit, the victim told Miner that the
prosecutor threatened to “put [the victim] in prison for perjury and contempt of court” if she
changed her anticipated testimony about Brackett’s conduct, and that the victim should “just take
the money for her and her family and walk away.” Id. at *2. Miner further alleged that the victim
informed him that she had initially told authorities that “nothing happened” between her and
Brackett, but she later changed her story so that she could “go about her day.” Id. at *2. The Idaho
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Brackett failed to satisfy the
Drapeau 2 standard for motions for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence because the
affidavit constituted inadmissible hearsay, could only have been used for impeachment, and would
not probably have resulted in an acquittal. Id. at * 3.
Brackett next filed a third motion for a new trial. See State v. Brackett, Docket No. 45071,
2018 WL 2145658 at *1 (Idaho App. 2017) (unpublished). In this motion, Brackett asserted,
among other things, that the state committed a Brady 3 violation based upon an affidavit from
Joshua Gabbert. (See id. at *1; #45071 R., pp.177-180. 4) In this affidavit, Gabbert alleged that

2

State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976).

3

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

4

Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court
take judicial notice of the clerk’s record associated with Brackett’s appeal from the district court’s
denial of his third motion for a new trial, Docket No. 45071.
2

the victim in Brackett’s case falsely accused him of rape to the Jerome County Sherriff. (#45071
R., p.180.) The district court entered an order denying the motion for a new trial. (#45071 R.,
pp.186-187.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the denial on a different ground than set forth
by the district court – that Brackett’s Brady claim based on the Gabbert affidavit was untimely
pursuant to I.C.R. 34(b)(2), and also failed a matter of law because Brackett did not demonstrate
that the state suppressed the allegations in the affidavit or that there was a reasonable probability
that the allegations would have led to a different result, as required to make a successful Brady
claim. Brackett, Docket No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 at *2-3.
In September 2017, Brackett filed a fourth motion for a new trial raising two grounds. (R.,
pp.97-116.) First, Brackett asserted that the state committed a Brady violation by withholding a
2014 letter written by Megan Gonzalez to the victim that was referenced by the prosecutor during
an April 1, 2016 hearing on Brackett’s second motion for a new trial, and which, Brackett asserts,
corroborated the allegations set forth in the Miner affidavit. (R., pp.97-99.) Brackett submitted a
transcript of the hearing as an exhibit. (R., pp.103-115.) In the letter to the victim, according to
the prosecutor’s statement at the 2016 hearing, Gonzalez wrote, “[t]here was once a person that
you love and loved you, and that person never hurt you,” and “[t]his person knows that the
prosecutor promised you money.” (R., p.111.) The prosecutor referenced the letter in response to
Brackett’s argument regarding the Miner affidavit, in the context of arguing that the allegations in
the Miner affidavit were not newly discovered and were cumulative with Brackett’s underlying
defense at the trial that the state conspired with the victim to wrongfully accuse Brackett of the
charged crimes. (R., pp.104-113.) Next, Brackett asserted the discovery of new evidence,
specifically, the same Gabbert affidavit that was the basis of the Brady claim raised in Brackett’s
third motion for a new trial, in which Gabbert asserted that the victim in Brackett’s case had falsely

3

accused Gabbert of rape. (R., pp.99, 116.) The state did not file a response to the motion. (See
R., p.95.)
The district court denied Brackett’s fourth motion for a new trial. 5 (R., pp.122-123.) The
court first concluded that, since no copy of the Gonzalez letter was in the record, it had no basis
from which to evaluate the letter’s relevance, if any. (R., p.122.) The court, apparently construing
Brackett’s Brady claim regarding the Gonzalez letter as an extension of Brackett’s previous newly
discovered evidence claim related to the Miner affidavit, also noted that it had already rejected
Brackett’s arguments regarding the Miner affidavit and that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit these
rulings. (Id.) The district court also rejected Brackett’s Drapeau newly discovered evidence claim
related to the Gabbert affidavit. (R., p.123.) The court concluded that Brackett failed to satisfy
the Drapeau standard because he failed to demonstrate that the allegations in the Gabbert affidavit
were newly discovered, constituted material rather than merely impeachment evidence, would
probably have produced an acquittal, or that the failure to learn of the allegations was due to no
lack of diligence on Brackett’s part. (Id.) Brackett timely appealed. (11/22/17 Notice of Appeal;
see also 12/27/17 Order (withdrawing Court’s previous order conditionally dismissing Brackett’s
appeal after Brackett submitted evidence that he placed the notice of appeal in the prison mailing
system in a timely matter).)

5

In this order, the district court erroneously referred to Brackett’s motion as his “third” motion for
a new trial. (R., p.122.) This confusion may be based on the fact that Brackett did not file an
appeal from the district court’s denial of his first motion for a new trial. See Brackett, Docket No.
44143, 2017 WL 5166933 at *1.
4

ISSUES
Brackett states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court error[sic] and/or abuse its discretion in denying
defendant[‘]s motion for a new trial[?]

2.

Did the district court error [sic] and/or abuse its discretion by allowing due
process and/or Brady law violations by the state[?]

3.

Did the court violate due process and/or Brady law by attempting to dilute
due process protections concerning disclosure and/or application of
exculpatory and/or material evidence by casting them in terms of state case
law and/or evidentiary law[?]

(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3 (capitalization modified).)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Brackett failed to show that the district court erred by denying his fourth motion for a
new trial?

5

ARGUMENT
Brackett Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Fourth Motion For
A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Brackett contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his fourth motion

for a new trial. (See generally Appellant’s brief.) A review of the record reveals that the district
court acted within its discretion to deny the motion because: (1) Brackett’s Brady claim related to
the Gonzalez letter was non-cognizable in a motion for a new trial and untimely; and (2) the district
court properly applied the Drapeau standard and correctly concluded that Brackett failed to
demonstrate he was entitled to a new trial on his newly discovered evidence claim related to the
Gabbert affidavit.

B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s discretion and

will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478,
481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995). A district court’s abuse of discretion is harmless if it does not affect
the defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g., State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d
582, 590 (2010).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Deny Brackett’s Fourth Motion For
A New Trial
1.

Brady Claim

In his fourth motion for a new trial, Brackett asserted that the state committed a Brady
violation by withholding a 2014 letter written by Megan Gonzalez to the victim that was referenced
by the prosecutor during an April 1, 2016 hearing on Brackett’s second motion for a new trial, and

6

which, Brackett asserts, corroborated the allegations set forth in his previously-submitted Miner
affidavit. (R., pp.97-99.) The district court rejected this claim because the Gonzalez letter was
not in the record and was thus incapable of review, and because the court had already rejected
Brackett’s related arguments pertaining to the Miner affidavit in the context of one of Brackett’s
previous motions for a new trial. (R., p.122.)
Regardless of the manner in which the district court chose to address Brackett’s Brady
claim, this Court can affirm the district court’s denial order because the claim is both noncognizable in a motion for a new trial and untimely. An appellate court may affirm a district court
order on any correct legal theory. See, e.g., State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218,
1222 (1997); State v. Diaz, 158 Idaho 629, 636, 349 P.3d 1220, 1227 (Ct. App. 2015); see also
Brackett, Docket No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 at *2-3 (affirming the district court’s denial of
Brackett’s Brady claim raised in his third motion for a new trial on grounds different than those
set forth by the district court). 6
Brackett’s Brady claim is non-cognizable in a motion for a new trial. As the Idaho Court
of Appeals noted in Brackett, Docket No. 44143, 2017 WL 5166933 *2 n.3, the Idaho Supreme
Court has consistently recognized that the bases for a new trial enumerated in I.C. § 19-2406 are
the exclusive grounds upon which a defendant’s motion may be granted. State v. Page, 135 Idaho

6

The Idaho appellate courts have recently reiterated that appellate court review is limited to the
evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below and that parties are precluded from
presenting legal questions and theories on appeal different than the ones they presented to the
lower court. See, e.g., State v. Dahl, 162 Idaho 541, 548, 400 P.3d 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2017); State
v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017); State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho
717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017); State v. Hoskins, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ____, 2018 WL
4169337 (Ct. App. 2018) (not yet final). In this case, however, the state did not file a response to
Brackett’s fourth motion for a new trial (See R., p.95), and now requests only that the appellate
court do what the Court of Appeals did in Brackett, Docket No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 at *23, affirm the district court’s denial of Brackett’s I.C. § 19-2406 Brady claim on a correct legal
theory – that the claim clearly fails as a matter of law as presented to the district court.
7

214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000); State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 493, 399 3d 804, 820 (2017).
The enumerated list of permissible grounds for motions for a new trial contained in I.C. § 19-2406
does not include Brady claims. Further, I.C.R. 34, which governs motions for a new trial, does not
itself provide any distinct grounds for a new trial that are not contained in I.C. § 19-2406. State v.
Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890, 899 (2000). The state notes that in Lankford, the Idaho
Supreme Court recognized these principles, but chose to consider Lankford’s Brady/prosecutorial
misconduct claim raised in an I.C. § 19-2406 motion for a new trial where Lankford challenged
the district court’s denial of the motion in the course of his direct appeal. Lankford, 162 Idaho at
493-494, 399 P.3d at 820-821. The Court stated it did so in that case because it “regularly review[s]
such claims on direct appeal to determine whether the judgment should be vacated and a new trial
granted.” Id.; see also State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 420-422, 313 P.3d 732, 748-750 (2013)
(considering district court’s denial of defendant’s Brady claim raised in motion for new trial where
challenge to denial was made in direct appeal). To the contrary, in the present case, Brackett’s
direct appeal has long since concluded. See Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 377 P.3d 1082. Therefore,
Brackett’s Brady claim is non-cognizable in an I.C. § 19-2406 motion for a new trial, and should
not be considered by this Court in a distinct appeal outside the context of Brackett’s direct appeal.
Further, even if Brackett’s Brady claim was cognizable, it was untimely. Pursuant to I.C.R.
34(b)(1), a motion for a new trial based on an assertion of newly discovered evidence must be filed
within two years of the final judgment. For the purposes of this rule, a judgment becomes “final”
when the appeal or time for appeal has completed. State v. Parrott, 138 Idaho 40, 42, 57 P.3d 509,
511 (Ct. App. 2002). However, “[a]ny motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than
newly discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict, finding of guilty, or
imposition of sentence, or within any further time the court may set during the 14-day period.”

8

I.C.R. 34(b)(2). Brackett was convicted of the underlying criminal charges in February 2013, and
was sentenced in September 2013. (See #45071 R., pp.65-71, 127.) Pursuant to I.C.R. 34(b)(2),
Brackett had 14 days from the “verdict, finding of guilty, or imposition of sentence,” to file a
motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence. Brackett’s
fourth motion for a new trial, filed on September 25, 2017 (R., pp.97-100), was therefore clearly
untimely with respect to his Brady claim. 7 Therefore, just as the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded
with respect to the Brady claim raised in Brackett’s third motion for a new trial, Brackett, Docket
No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 at *2, Brackett’s Brady claim raised in his fourth motion for a new
trial was likewise untimely.
Finally, even if this Court chooses to reach the merits of Brackett’s Brady claim, the claim
fails. As the district court noted (R., p.122), the Gonzalez letter was not a part of the record so the
court had no basis from which to evaluate it. Therefore, Brackett could not demonstrate that any
letter from Megan Gonzalez was suppressed by the state, or that prejudice resulted, as required for
a Brady claim. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 389,
313 P.3d 1, 45 (2013). 8
Brackett’s Brady claim related to the Gonzalez letter is both non-cognizable in an I.C.
§ 19-2406 motion for a new trial and untimely. Because the claim thus fails as a matter of law,

7

Assuming a defendant could meet the procedural requirements, including that the issue could not
have been raised on direct appeal, a post-conviction petition would be the appropriate means by
which to raise a Brady claim after the I.C.R. 34(b)(2) time limit expired. See I.C. § 19-4901.
8

The state acknowledges that the district court’s other stated ground for denying the claim, that it
had already rejected Brackett’s arguments related to the Miner affidavit and that it lacked
jurisdiction to revisit that ruling, was erroneous. Brackett’s claim from his second motion for a
new trial regarding the Miner affidavit was not the same as his Brady claim from his fourth motion
for a new trial that was based upon the Gonzalez letter.
9

this Court should affirm the district court’s order denying it. 9
2.

Newly Discovered Evidence

In his fourth motion for a new trial, Brackett also argued that a March 2016 affidavit of
Joshua Gabbert, which Brackett previously submitted in the context of a Brady claim in his third
motion for a new trial, constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to a new trial. (R.,
p.99.) On appeal, Brackett contends that the district court erred by applying the Drapeau standard
to this claim. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) Brackett’s argument fails because Drapeau is the
relevant applicable standard to motions for a new trial raised in Idaho. In any event, as the district
court properly concluded (R., p.123), the allegations contained in the Gabbert affidavit do not
satisfy this standard.
In State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court
articulated the four-part test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence. That test requires a defendant to show that the evidence offered
in support of his motion for a new trial: (1) is newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant
at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce
an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of
the defendant. Id. at 691, 551 P.2d at 978. The burden to show that each of these criteria is satisfied
rests with the movant. State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 605, 930 P.2d 1039, 1047 (Ct. App. 1996).
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright’s text on Federal Practice

9

The state has construed Brackett’s claim related to the Gonzalez letter as a Brady claim due to
the multiple references to Brady and to the alleged withholding of evidence contained in Brackett’s
fourth motion for a new trial. (R., pp.97-99.) However, even if this Court chooses to construe
Brackett’s claim regarding the Gonzalez letter as a newly discovered evidence claim, the claim
still fails because it cannot satisfy the Drapeau standard. Because the letter is not in the record,
Brackett cannot demonstrate any of the Drapeau prongs, or even that he has “discovered” any “new
evidence” to begin with.
10

and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, “after a man has had his day in court, and has
been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial.” Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691,
551 P.2d at 978 (citation omitted). “Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
are disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance accorded to
considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and conservation of scarce judicial
resources.” State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144, 191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations
and citations omitted) (quoting State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574, 577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App.
2007)).
On appeal, Brackett does not appear to contend that the district court erred in its application
of the Drapeau standard to the facts of this case. Instead, Brackett contends that the district court
erred by applying the Drapeau standard in the first place. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) Specifically,
Brackett asserts that Drapeau is an “outdated case,” and that the district court should have instead
applied United States Supreme Court caselaw such as United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985), Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), and Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867
(2006), in which the United States Supreme Court analyzed Brady claims. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.4-7.)
Brackett is incorrect because he confuses constitutional Brady claims, which may be raised
on direct appeal or in post-conviction petitions, with state-law based motions for a new trial based
upon newly discovered evidence raised pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406. See Lankford, 162 Idaho at
502-503, 399 P.3d at 829-830 (discussing the distinction between Brady claims and I.C. § 19-2406
newly discovered evidence claims and noting that the standards for relief on a Brady claim are less
stringent than that required by the Drapeau standard because a defendant’s burden of proof under
Brady is lower than it is under Drapeau); see also Branigh, 155 Idaho at 420-422, 313 P.3d at 748-
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750. The Idaho Supreme Court has not disavowed the Drapeau standard for I.C. § 19-2406 newly
discovered evidence claims, which continues to be applied by Idaho appellate courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Zuniga, Docket No. 45388, 2018 WL 2710901 at *1-2 (Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished);
State v. Fairbanks, Docket No. 43324, 2016 WL 4486429 at *3-5 (Ct. App. 2018) (unpublished);
State v. Jimenez, 159 Idaho 466, 472-474, 362 P.3d 541, 547-549 (Ct. App. 2015); State v.
Ellington, 157 Idaho 480, 485-488, 337 P.3d 639, 644-647 (2014). Therefore, the district court
did not err by applying the Drapeau standard in this case.
In any event, even if this Court chooses to review the district court’s Drapeau analysis,
Brackett cannot show that the district court erred in concluding that the allegations in the Gabbert
affidavit failed to satisfy the Drapeau standard.

First, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already

concluded that the Gabbert affidavit did not satisfy the more stringent Brady standard, and that
Brackett failed to demonstrate even a “reasonable probability” that the disclosure of the evidence
would have led to a different result. Brackett, Docket No. 45071, 2018 WL 2145658 at *3. For
the same reasons, Brackett cannot satisfy the less-stringent Drapeau standard that the evidence
would “probably” produce an acquittal. The Gabbert affidavit consisted of alleged hearsay
statements of the victim that would be inadmissible at trial. A district court conducting a Drapeau
analysis may consider the admissibility of newly discovered evidence supporting a motion for a
new trial in determining whether such evidence would probably produce an acquittal. See State v.
Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 77, 675 P.2d 49, 56 (Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, the hearsay allegations
against the victim, even if admissible, would not probably have resulted in an acquittal considering
the overwhelming evidence of Brackett’s guilt presented at the jury trial. (See #41578 Trial Tr.,
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p.2817, L.5 – p.2843, L.5; p.2899, L.10 – p.2910, L.22) 10 (the prosecutor’s summary of the state’s
evidence of Brackett’s guilt recited during closing and rebuttal arguments at the conclusion of the
second jury trial, including evidence obtained from a camera and SD memory card found at
Brackett’s residence which corroborated the victim’s testimony).)
The allegations in the Gabbert affidavit also fail the Drapeau test because they consist of
merely impeachment evidence. The Idaho Court of Appeals has described the difference between
impeachment evidence and substantive evidence as follows:
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of persuading
the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the determination of the
tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to discredit a witness,
i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence
which explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-869, 119 P.3d 637, 643-644 (Ct. App. 2004). Evidence may
be both substantive and impeaching. Id.
In this case, the proffered allegations of Gabbert against the victim constituted, at best,
impeachment evidence. None of the allegations would be offered “for the purpose of persuading
the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition” regarding whether or not Brackett engaged in a
sexual relationship with the victim or possessed the sexually explicit photos.

Instead, the

allegations could be used only to attempt to discredit the victim’s credibility.
Finally, as the district court additionally concluded (R., p.123), Brackett failed to allege
that the information in the affidavit was newly discovered or unknown to him at the time of trial,
or that any failure to learn of the evidence prior to trial was not due to the lack of due diligence on
his part. (See R., pp.97-100.) Brackett therefore failed to satisfy any of the prongs of the Drapeu
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Contemporaneous with this brief, the state filed a motion requesting that the Idaho Supreme
Court take judicial notice of the transcript from Brackett’s second jury trial, which was part of the
appellate record in Brackett’s direct appeal, Docket No. 41578.
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test with respect to this evidence.
The district court properly concluded that the allegations in the Gabbert affidavit do not
satisfy the Drapeau newly discovered evidence test. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district
court’s denial of this claim and Brackett’s fourth motion for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying
Brackett’s fourth motion for a new trial.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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